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When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and pivoting to userspace managed stacks. Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable. Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the shadow stack during the writable window. The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token. First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides: 1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK. 2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks. It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been written to. 3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct action than a hint at future desired behavior. So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way. The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with map_shadow_stack: void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN); Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
470 lines
9.7 KiB
C
470 lines
9.7 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation.
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* Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/bitops.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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#include <linux/sizes.h>
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#include <linux/user.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <asm/msr.h>
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#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
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#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
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#include <asm/shstk.h>
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#include <asm/special_insns.h>
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#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
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#include <asm/prctl.h>
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#define SS_FRAME_SIZE 8
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static bool features_enabled(unsigned long features)
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{
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return current->thread.features & features;
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}
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static void features_set(unsigned long features)
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{
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current->thread.features |= features;
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}
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static void features_clr(unsigned long features)
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{
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current->thread.features &= ~features;
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}
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/*
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* Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always 8-byte
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* and aligned to 8.
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*/
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static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr)
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{
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unsigned long addr;
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/* Token must be aligned */
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if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8))
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return -EINVAL;
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addr = ssp - SS_FRAME_SIZE;
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/*
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* SSP is aligned, so reserved bits and mode bit are a zero, just mark
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* the token 64-bit.
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*/
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ssp |= BIT(0);
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if (write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)addr, (u64)ssp))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (token_addr)
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*token_addr = addr;
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return 0;
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}
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static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
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unsigned long token_offset, bool set_res_tok)
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{
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int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ABOVE4G;
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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unsigned long mapped_addr, unused;
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if (addr)
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flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE;
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mmap_write_lock(mm);
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mapped_addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_READ, flags,
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VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE, 0, &unused, NULL);
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mmap_write_unlock(mm);
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if (!set_res_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(mapped_addr))
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goto out;
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if (create_rstor_token(mapped_addr + token_offset, NULL)) {
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vm_munmap(mapped_addr, size);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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out:
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return mapped_addr;
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}
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static unsigned long adjust_shstk_size(unsigned long size)
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{
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if (size)
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return PAGE_ALIGN(size);
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return PAGE_ALIGN(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G));
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}
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static void unmap_shadow_stack(u64 base, u64 size)
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{
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while (1) {
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int r;
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r = vm_munmap(base, size);
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/*
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* vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
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* something else, and that lock should not be held for a
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* long time. Retry it for the case.
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*/
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if (r == -EINTR) {
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cond_resched();
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continue;
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}
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/*
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* For all other types of vm_munmap() failure, either the
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* system is out of memory or there is bug.
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*/
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WARN_ON_ONCE(r);
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break;
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}
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}
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static int shstk_setup(void)
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{
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struct thread_shstk *shstk = ¤t->thread.shstk;
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unsigned long addr, size;
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/* Already enabled */
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if (features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
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return 0;
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/* Also not supported for 32 bit and x32 */
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if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) || in_32bit_syscall())
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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size = adjust_shstk_size(0);
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addr = alloc_shstk(0, size, 0, false);
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if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
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return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
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fpregs_lock_and_load();
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wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
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wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
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fpregs_unlock();
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shstk->base = addr;
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shstk->size = size;
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features_set(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
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return 0;
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}
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void reset_thread_features(void)
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{
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memset(¤t->thread.shstk, 0, sizeof(struct thread_shstk));
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current->thread.features = 0;
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current->thread.features_locked = 0;
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}
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unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
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unsigned long stack_size)
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{
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struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
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unsigned long addr, size;
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/*
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* If shadow stack is not enabled on the new thread, skip any
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* switch to a new shadow stack.
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*/
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if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
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return 0;
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/*
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* For CLONE_VM, except vfork, the child needs a separate shadow
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* stack.
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*/
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if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) != CLONE_VM)
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return 0;
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size = adjust_shstk_size(stack_size);
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addr = alloc_shstk(0, size, 0, false);
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if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
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return addr;
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shstk->base = addr;
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shstk->size = size;
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return addr + size;
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}
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static unsigned long get_user_shstk_addr(void)
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{
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unsigned long long ssp;
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fpregs_lock_and_load();
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rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
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fpregs_unlock();
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return ssp;
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}
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#define SHSTK_DATA_BIT BIT(63)
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static int put_shstk_data(u64 __user *addr, u64 data)
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{
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(data & SHSTK_DATA_BIT))
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* Mark the high bit so that the sigframe can't be processed as a
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* return address.
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*/
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if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, data | SHSTK_DATA_BIT))
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return -EFAULT;
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return 0;
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}
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static int get_shstk_data(unsigned long *data, unsigned long __user *addr)
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{
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unsigned long ldata;
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if (unlikely(get_user(ldata, addr)))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (!(ldata & SHSTK_DATA_BIT))
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return -EINVAL;
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*data = ldata & ~SHSTK_DATA_BIT;
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return 0;
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}
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static int shstk_push_sigframe(unsigned long *ssp)
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{
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unsigned long target_ssp = *ssp;
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/* Token must be aligned */
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if (!IS_ALIGNED(target_ssp, 8))
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return -EINVAL;
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*ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
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if (put_shstk_data((void *__user)*ssp, target_ssp))
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return -EFAULT;
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return 0;
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}
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static int shstk_pop_sigframe(unsigned long *ssp)
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{
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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unsigned long token_addr;
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bool need_to_check_vma;
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int err = 1;
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/*
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* It is possible for the SSP to be off the end of a shadow stack by 4
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* or 8 bytes. If the shadow stack is at the start of a page or 4 bytes
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* before it, it might be this case, so check that the address being
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* read is actually shadow stack.
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*/
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if (!IS_ALIGNED(*ssp, 8))
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return -EINVAL;
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need_to_check_vma = PAGE_ALIGN(*ssp) == *ssp;
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if (need_to_check_vma)
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mmap_read_lock_killable(current->mm);
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err = get_shstk_data(&token_addr, (unsigned long __user *)*ssp);
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if (unlikely(err))
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goto out_err;
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if (need_to_check_vma) {
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vma = find_vma(current->mm, *ssp);
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if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
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err = -EFAULT;
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goto out_err;
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}
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mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
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}
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/* Restore SSP aligned? */
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if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(token_addr, 8)))
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return -EINVAL;
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/* SSP in userspace? */
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if (unlikely(token_addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX))
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return -EINVAL;
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*ssp = token_addr;
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return 0;
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out_err:
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if (need_to_check_vma)
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mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
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return err;
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}
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int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig)
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{
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void __user *restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
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unsigned long ssp;
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int err;
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if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
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!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
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return 0;
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if (!restorer)
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return -EINVAL;
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ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
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if (unlikely(!ssp))
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return -EINVAL;
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err = shstk_push_sigframe(&ssp);
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if (unlikely(err))
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return err;
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/* Push restorer address */
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ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
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err = write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)restorer);
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if (unlikely(err))
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return -EFAULT;
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fpregs_lock_and_load();
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wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
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fpregs_unlock();
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return 0;
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}
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int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void)
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{
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unsigned long ssp;
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int err;
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if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
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!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
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return 0;
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ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
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if (unlikely(!ssp))
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return -EINVAL;
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err = shstk_pop_sigframe(&ssp);
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if (unlikely(err))
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return err;
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fpregs_lock_and_load();
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wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
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fpregs_unlock();
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return 0;
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}
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void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
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if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
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!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
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return;
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/*
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* When fork() with CLONE_VM fails, the child (tsk) already has a
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* shadow stack allocated, and exit_thread() calls this function to
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* free it. In this case the parent (current) and the child share
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* the same mm struct.
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*/
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if (!tsk->mm || tsk->mm != current->mm)
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return;
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unmap_shadow_stack(shstk->base, shstk->size);
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}
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static int shstk_disable(void)
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{
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if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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/* Already disabled? */
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if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
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return 0;
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fpregs_lock_and_load();
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/* Disable WRSS too when disabling shadow stack */
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wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0);
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wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
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fpregs_unlock();
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shstk_free(current);
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features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
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return 0;
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}
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
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{
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bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN;
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unsigned long aligned_size;
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if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* If there isn't space for a token */
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if (set_tok && size < 8)
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return -ENOSPC;
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if (addr && addr < SZ_4G)
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return -ERANGE;
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/*
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* An overflow would result in attempting to write the restore token
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* to the wrong location. Not catastrophic, but just return the right
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* error code and block it.
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*/
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aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
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if (aligned_size < size)
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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return alloc_shstk(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok);
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}
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long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long features)
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{
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if (option == ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK) {
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task->thread.features_locked |= features;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Don't allow via ptrace */
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if (task != current)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Do not allow to change locked features */
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if (features & task->thread.features_locked)
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return -EPERM;
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/* Only support enabling/disabling one feature at a time. */
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if (hweight_long(features) > 1)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (option == ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE) {
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/* Handle ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE */
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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