Files
lkl_linux/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
Sumit Garg 01bbafc63b KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage
Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and
__exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led
to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.

However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init()
and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or
security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead.

Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately
the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its
future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not.

Reported-and-tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t
Fixes: 5d0682be31 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2023-10-10 11:19:43 -07:00

395 lines
9.0 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
* Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited
*
* See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
*/
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/static_call.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
static char *trusted_rng = "default";
module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
static char *trusted_key_source;
module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)");
static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
{ "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops },
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
{ "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops },
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
{ "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops },
#endif
};
DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal);
DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
static void (*trusted_key_exit)(void);
static unsigned char migratable;
enum {
Opt_err,
Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
};
static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{Opt_new, "new"},
{Opt_load, "load"},
{Opt_update, "update"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
/*
* datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
* payload structure
*
* On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
*/
static int datablob_parse(char **datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
long keylen;
int ret = -EINVAL;
int key_cmd;
char *c;
/* main command */
c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
if (!c)
return -EINVAL;
key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_new:
/* first argument is key size */
c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
if (!c)
return -EINVAL;
ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
p->key_len = keylen;
ret = Opt_new;
break;
case Opt_load:
/* first argument is sealed blob */
c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
if (!c)
return -EINVAL;
p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
if (ret < 0)
return -EINVAL;
ret = Opt_load;
break;
case Opt_update:
ret = Opt_update;
break;
case Opt_err:
return -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
int ret;
ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p));
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
goto err;
p->migratable = migratable;
err:
return p;
}
/*
* trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
*
* Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
* random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
* adding it to the specified keyring.
*
* On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
*/
static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
char *datablob, *orig_datablob;
int ret = 0;
int key_cmd;
size_t key_len;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
datablob[datalen] = '\0';
payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
if (!payload) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
key_cmd = datablob_parse(&datablob, payload);
if (key_cmd < 0) {
ret = key_cmd;
goto out;
}
dump_payload(payload);
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_load:
ret = static_call(trusted_key_unseal)(payload, datablob);
dump_payload(payload);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
break;
case Opt_new:
key_len = payload->key_len;
ret = static_call(trusted_key_get_random)(payload->key,
key_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (ret != key_len) {
pr_info("key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(payload, datablob);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
out:
kfree_sensitive(orig_datablob);
if (!ret)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
else
kfree_sensitive(payload);
return ret;
}
static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
kfree_sensitive(p);
}
/*
* trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
*/
static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
char *datablob, *orig_datablob;
int ret = 0;
if (key_is_negative(key))
return -ENOKEY;
p = key->payload.data[0];
if (!p->migratable)
return -EPERM;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
if (!new_p) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
datablob[datalen] = '\0';
ret = datablob_parse(&datablob, new_p);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kfree_sensitive(new_p);
goto out;
}
/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
dump_payload(p);
dump_payload(new_p);
ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(new_p, datablob);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
kfree_sensitive(new_p);
goto out;
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
kfree_sensitive(orig_datablob);
return ret;
}
/*
* trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
* On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
*/
static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
size_t buflen)
{
const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
char *bufp;
int i;
p = dereference_key_locked(key);
if (!p)
return -EINVAL;
if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
bufp = buffer;
for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
}
return 2 * p->blob_len;
}
/*
* trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
*/
static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
.name = "trusted",
.instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
.update = trusted_update,
.destroy = trusted_destroy,
.describe = user_describe,
.read = trusted_read,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
static int kernel_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
{
return get_random_bytes_wait(key, key_len) ?: key_len;
}
static int __init init_trusted(void)
{
int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
int i, ret = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) {
if (trusted_key_source &&
strncmp(trusted_key_source, trusted_key_sources[i].name,
strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name)))
continue;
/*
* We always support trusted.rng="kernel" and "default" as
* well as trusted.rng=$trusted.source if the trust source
* defines its own get_random callback.
*/
get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random;
if (trusted_rng && strcmp(trusted_rng, "default")) {
if (!strcmp(trusted_rng, "kernel")) {
get_random = kernel_get_random;
} else if (strcmp(trusted_rng, trusted_key_sources[i].name) ||
!get_random) {
pr_warn("Unsupported RNG. Supported: kernel");
if (get_random)
pr_cont(", %s", trusted_key_sources[i].name);
pr_cont(", default\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (!get_random)
get_random = kernel_get_random;
static_call_update(trusted_key_seal,
trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal,
trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random,
get_random);
trusted_key_exit = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit;
migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
ret = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init();
if (!ret)
break;
}
/*
* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
* trusted key implementation is not found.
*/
if (ret == -ENODEV)
return 0;
return ret;
}
static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
{
if (trusted_key_exit)
(*trusted_key_exit)();
}
late_initcall(init_trusted);
module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");