aleph/lkl_linux
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/lkl/linux.git synced 2025-12-19 08:03:01 +09:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages

Browse Source 
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-23 14:29:27 -07:00
committed by David S. Miller
parent aa4cf9452f
commit 90f62cf30a
19 changed files with 38 additions and 36 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
View File

@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static void cn_proc_mcast_ctl(struct cn_msg *msg,
return;
/* Can only change if privileged. */
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
if (!__netlink_ns_capable(nsp, &init_user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = EPERM;
goto out;
}