kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down

Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
Matthew Garrett
2019-08-19 17:18:01 -07:00
committed by James Morris
parent b0c8fdc7fd
commit 29d3c1c8df
5 changed files with 71 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -129,4 +129,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func);
#else
static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
{
return false;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */